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Statement Showing Jurisdiction of the Appellate Court.
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals, under §78A-4103, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended), to hear appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment,
property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity.

Statement of the Issues.
First Issue: What is the standard required in order to modify a prior order of the
court, and must the court return to the original decree, if there have been subsequent modifications of that original decree?
Determinative Law: Sections 30-3-5(3); Krambule v. Krambule, 994 P.2d
210 (Utah App. 1999), Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713 (Utah Ct.App.1990); Williamson v. Williamson, 1999 UT App 219,5 8, 983 P.2d 1103; and Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47, J 11, 997 P.2d 903. See also, Diener v. Diener, 98 P.3d
1178, 508 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 2004 UT App 314, and Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 86
P.3d767,2004UTApp37.
Standard of Review: "The determination to modify a divorce decree is generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Kelley v. Kelley, 2000
UT App 236,5 20, 9 P.3d 171. However, 4[q]uestions about the legal adequacy of
findings of fact and the legal accuracy of the trial court's statements present issues
of law, which we review for correctness, according no deference to the trial court.'
In re C.K., 2000 UT App 11,11 17, 996 P.2d 1059. " Van Dyke, 86 P.3d at 769,
2004 UT App al 5 9. This Court reviews, "the district court's decision for correct1

ness to the extent it involves questions of statutory interpretation." Diener, 98 P.3d
at 1180,5 4. This Court reviews, "the district court's decision for correctness to the
extent it involves questions of statutory interpretation." Diener, 98P.3d at 1180,5
4. This Court reviews, "the determination to modify a divorce decree for an abuse
of discretion, insofar as that determination is based on a conclusion of law, we review it for correctness." Krambule, 994 P.2d at 213, \ 10.

Second Issue: When one party's filing of a bankruptcy was previously raised in a
trial, can the trial court use that same bankruptcy filing, in a subsequent trial, to
modify those prior orders, or is that action barred under the doctrine of res judicata!
Determinative Law: Sections 30-3-5(3), and 78B-12-217, Utah Code Annot.
(1953, as amended); Huish v. Munroy 191 P.3d 1242, 2008 UT App 283; Diener,
98 P.3d 1178, 508 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 2004 UT App 314, Wan Dyke, 86 P.3d 767,
2004 UT App 37; and Maoris & Associates v. Neways, Inc, 16 P.3d 1214 (Ujtah
2000).
Standard of Review: "The determination to modify a divorce decree is generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Kelley v. Kelley, 2000
UT App 236,J 20, 9 P.3d 171. However, '[questions about the legal adequacy of
findings of fact and the legal accuracy of the trial court's statements present issues
of law, which we review for correctness, according no deference to the trial court.'
In re C.K., 2000 UT App 11,11 17, 996 P.2d 1059. " Van Dyke, 86 P.3d at 769,
2004 UT App 3 5 9. This Court reviews, "the determination to modify a divorce
decree for an abuse of discretion, insofar as that determination is based on a con2

elusion of law, we review it for correctness." Krambule, 994 P.2d, at 213, f 10.

Third Issue: Was there a material change in circumstances of the parties, to warrant a change in the ongoing child support obligation, and can that change be applied retroactively to a date earlier than when a petition, or request for a change
was made?
Determinative Law: Sections 30-3-5(3), §78B-12-210, Utah Code Annot.
(1953, as amended), and §78B-12-112(4), Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended).
See also, Black v. Black, 199 P.3d 371 2008 UT App 465; Wall v. Wall, 157 P.3d
341, 2007 UT App 61; Wilde v. Wilde, 35 P.3d 341, UT App 318 (UT App. 2001);
and, Brooks v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955 (UT App. 1994).
Standard of review: The Court of Appeals reviews, "a trial court's statutory
interpretations under a correction of error standard with no deference to the trial
court." Black, 199 P.3d at 373, 2008 UT App 465, 5f 7.
"The determination to modify a divorce decree is generally reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard. However, questions about the legal adequacy of
findings of fact and the legal accuracy of the trial court's statements present issues
of law, which we review for correctness." Wall, 157 P.3d at 342, 2007 UT App
61,5 7 (quotations and citations omitted). See also, Diener, 98 P.3d at 1180,5 4.

Fourth Issue: Was there a material change in circumstances of the parties sufficient to warrant requiring a reimbursement of one-half (1/2) of Petitioner's reasonable school expenses?

3

Determinative Law: Sections 30-3-5(3), and 78B-12-210, Utah Code Annot.
(1953, as amended). See also, Brooks, 881 P.2d 955.
Standard of Review: 'The determination to modify a divorce decree is generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Kelley v. Kelley, 2000
UT App 236,5 20, 9 P.3d 171. However, 4[q]uestions about the legal adequacy of
findings of fact and the legal accuracy of the trial court's statements present issues
of law, which we review for correctness, according no deference to the trial court.'
In re C.K., 2000 UT App 11,11 17, 996 P.2d 1059. " Van Dyke, 86 P.3d at 769,
2004 UT App 37,5 9.

Fifth Issue: Was there a material change in circumstances of the parties sufficient
to warrant requiring that any required reimbursement be paid, without the requesting party having to show that he, or she, paid the underlying bill?
Determinative Law: Sections 30-3-5(3), 78B-12-212, and 78B-12-214, Utah
Code Annot. (1953, as amended). See also, Brooks, 881 P.2d 955.
Standard of review: "The determination to modify a divorce decree is generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. However, questions about
the legal adequacy of findings of fact and the legal accuracy of the trial court's
statements present issues of law, which we review for correctness." Wall, 157 P.3d
at 342, 2007 UT App 61, $ 7 (quotations and citations omitted).

4

Statement on Preservation of Issue:
" 4 [T]o preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must first raise the issue
in the trial court' giving that court an opportunity to rule on the issue." Searle v.
Searle, 38 P.3d 307, 313 (Utah App. 2001), citations omitted.
The Trial Court had ample opportunity to rule on the issues raised in this appeal. The Trial Court stated that it had, "fully reviewed the file since the last bench
trial on a petition to modify." Transcript at p. 1, lines 13-14. It was at that, "last
bench trial", that the Trial Court heard evidence of Mr. Davis' 2003 bankruptcy,
and the impact it had on Ms Davis. See, the 2005 Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, hereinafter, "2005 Findings of Fact", 5 13, 15 - 19, and 28. Record at pp.
530, 529, and 527, respectively. See also, Transcript at p. 24, lines 4 - 9 . That,
"last bench trial", was the trial held on April 21, 2005, hereinafter referred to as
the, "2005 Trial". Record at 630 - 633.
At the January 28, 2010, trial, hereinafter the, "2010 Trial", the Trial Court
noted that Mr. Davis filed a bankruptcy in 2003, and had not filed another bankruptcy subsequent thereto. Transcript at p. 23, lines 11 — 16, and p. 57, lines 20 —
23. In fact, the Court noted that, "[o]n the issue of bankruptcy - since the bankruptcy was filed in 2003 and since you had a bench trial in 2005, any issues relating
to the effect of the bankruptcy should have been brought up at that trial, because I my reading is the judge actually put in his findings and decree something about the
bankruptcy." Transcript at p. 24, lines 4 — 9, and at p. 29, lines 1—7. The Trial
Court again noted that the issues relating to the bankruptcy were heard at the 2005
trial, but that Ms Davis was alleged subsequent impacts to her life. Transcript, at p.
108, lines 8 - 16.
5

Additionally, Mr. Davis raised the res judicata issue in his Answer to Petition
for Modification. Record at 566. Mr. Davis specifically stated that, "Petitioner's
Petition to Modify is repetitive of the issues previously brought before this court and
were discussed at the time of the last trial (held April 2005)..." Answer to Petition
for Modification, 5 2. Record at 566. Mr. Davis then expounded on his claim, point
for point, addressing the 2003 Bankruptcy, money for expenses, and the use of the
children for tax exemptions. Record at 564 - 565.
The tax issue, that of the award of the children for tax purposes, was modified
at the 2005 Trial as well. Transcript at p. 28, lines 17 — 23, and p. 30, lines 1-8.
See also, 2005 Findings of Fact, $ 28, and 2005 Order, J 16, record at 527, and
535, respectively. In the instant matter, Ms Davis' whole theory was that, because
of Mr. Davis' bankruptcy, it was only fair that she be awarded all of the children as
tax exemptions. Transcript at p. 94, lines 3 — 14.
Mr. Davis argued that he should not be required to pay additional fees, or
costs, for the children's school, or other such related expenses; his child support
covers all such obligations. Transcript at p. 31, line 21 through p. 32, line 25.
The record shows that Ms Davis admitted that ORS would not adjust the ongoing child support, and that any such change did not exceed ten percent (10%).
Transcript at p. 52, line 18, through p. 53, line 3, and p. 78, line 23, through p. 79,
line 7. See also, Mr. Davis' Exhibit #3.
Mr. Davis also brought to the Trial Court's attention his claims that, for purposes of reimbursement of expenses, Ms Davis should show proof that she paid
those expenses. Transcript, at p. 13, line 9, through p. 14, line 13.
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Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances, and Rules.
Constitution:

No determinative constitutional provisions are raised, or apply,

herein.
Statutes:
§30-3-5, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended);
§78B-12-112, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended); and,
§78B-12-210, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended).
Rules: No determinative rules are raised, or apply herein.

Statement of the Case.
Nature of the Case:
This is a divorce matter, in which the Decree of Divorce was signed and entered, on May 23, 2002. Record at 99. Since that time, the Decree of Divorce was
modified at trial, on April 21, 2005, the "2005 Trial", and by stipulation of the parties on, or about, April 10, 2006. Record at 534 - 538, and 557, respectively.
The current matter was commenced by Ms Davis, by way of a Petition to
Modify, filed April 4, 2008, hereinafter referred to as, "2008 Petition". Record at
559. Shortly after that, Ms Davis was no longer represented, and the parties filed
various and sundry petitions and motions,pro se.
Ms Davis sought to modify the prior orders of the Court, because of Mr.
Davis' bankruptcy, filed in 2003. See, 2008 Petition, 3ffl 2A, and 2B, record at 559.
See also, Transcript at p. 4, line 18, through p. 5, line 5. She raised the issues of
additional expenses for the children for extracurricular activities, school registration, tests, and other fees; child support; use of the children as a tax exemption;
7

and, alleged damage to her credit. See, 2008 Petition,flfl2c - 5, record at 558. See
also, Transcript at p. 4, line 18, through p. 5, line 5.

Course of Proceedings:
As the parties were, for the most part, acting pro se, numerous additional petitions and counter-petitions were filed right up to trial. See, Minutes Half Day
Trial, Record at 633. See also, Record at 587 - 632. After a telephone conference,
on January 21, 2010, the matter was set for trial. Record at 629. Transcript at p. 3,
lines 13 - 20.
The Trial Court held a bench trial on January 28, 2010, hereinafter referred
to as, "2010 Trial", the Honorable David N. Mortensen presiding. Record at 633.
Both parties appeared pro se, were sworn, and testified. Record at 632 - 633.
The Trial Court received various exhibits. Record at 630 - 631.
Ms Davis, in support of her claims, submitted a Credco Credit Report (Plaintiffs Exhibit #2), a Third District Court Complaint, with attachments (Plaintiffs
Exhibit #7), and the front page of a tax return (Plaintiffs Exhibit #1). The Credit
Report (Plaintiffs Exhibit #2) is contained in the attachments to the Third District
Complaint (Plaintiffs Exhibit #7), which address marital debts that were established in 2000, well before the divorce, Mr. Davis' 2003 Bankruptcy, or the 2005
modification. See, Plaintiffs Exhibits 2, and 7.

Disposition at Trial Court:
After the Trial Court heard the testimony of the parties, and received their
exhibits, it took the matter under advisement. Record at 632. Subsequent thereto,
8

Mr. Davis filed a Trial Brief, and Ms Davis filed a Response to Trial Brief. Record
at 661, and 665, respectively. The only pertinent issue addressed in those Briefs is
the allegation that the oldest child works, and pays for her own gasoline, and miscellaneous expenses. Record at 659.
On February 17, 2010, the Trial Court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Modifying Decree, the, "2010 Findings". Record at 679.
On April 23, 2010, the Trial Court signed and entered, its Order on Modification of
Divorce Decree (January 28, 2010), the, "2010 Order". Record at 725.
The 2010 Order, in pertinent part:
a.

Raised Mr. Davis' child support, "to $1,287 per month, retroac-

tive to April 4, 2008." 2010 Order, 5 2. Record at 724. Note, no child support worksheet was located in the Record, nor is there any mention thereof,
in any associated pleadings.
b.

Awarded Ms Davis, "the tax exemption for the minor children

of the parties." 2010 Order, 5 3. Record at 724.
c.

Modified the prior orders such that, Mr. Davis is required to re-

imburse Ms Davis, "for one half of reasonable school expenses." 2010 Order, 5 8. Record at 723.
d.

Modified the prior orders on the issue of reimbursement, stating

that, when one party makes a claim for reimbursement, "[t]he party need not
show that the bill has actually been paid, but need only show that the expense has been incurred." 2010 Order, J 10. Record at 723.
Those orders were pronounced, based upon the Trial Court's 2010 Findings
of Fact. While the actual Findings of Fact portion, of the 2010 Findings of Fact,
9

consists of eight (8) pages, four (4) of those pages are dedicated to the 2003 Bankruptcy. Record at 670 - 678. Another two (2) pages of that section are devoted to
explaining the differences between and Order to Show Cause, and a Petition to
Modify. Record at 678-679.
When not dealing with the Bankruptcy issue, the Trial Court found:
a-

One of the minor children turned 18. Record at 677.

b.

Mr. Davis' income has changed from $5,026 per month, to

$6,248 per month. Record at 675.
c.

Ms Davis, who previously was not working, and had minimum

wage imputed to her, was working, at a slightly higher rate, and her monthly
income changed from $940, to $1,287. Id.
d.

Based thereon, Mr. Davis' monthly child support should be

$1,287, where it had been $940. Id. Note, no child support worksheet is
mentioned, nor located, in the Record.
e.

"[T]hat because of the financial impact the bankruptcy has had

upon the petitioner, the petitioner should be able to claim all the tax exemptions for all the children. Accordingly, the wife is awarded the tax exemption for the minor children of the parties." Record at 673.
f.

Furthermore, on the issue of the tax deduction, the Trial Court

further found, "that the bankruptcy filed by respondent is a breach of the
condition of the original stipulation and decree that he pay certain marital
debts. The only remedy sought by the petitioner is that she receive the financial benefit of the tax deduction. The court agrees this will be a just and
fair result given that respondent has failed to perform." Record at 671.
10

g.

Immediately thereafter, the Trial Court made the simple finding

that, "where the decree provides for reimbursement... The party need not
show that the bill has actually been paid, but need only show that it has been
incurred.'" Record at 670.

Statement of Relevant Facts:
1.

The parties were divorced, with the Decree of Divorce being signed

and entered, on May 23, 2002. Record at 99.
2.

Mr. Davis' bankruptcy, the, "2003 Bankruptcy", was filed in 2003.

Record at 530, 565 - 566. Transcript at p. 4, line 18, through p. 5, line 5, and p.
23, lines 7 - 18.
3.

The Decree of Divorce was modified on October 26, 2005, by way of

a trial held on April 21, 2005, hereinafter referred to as the, "2005 Trial". Record
at 630-633.
4.

In the 2005 Trial, the Court found, among other things, that Mr.

Davis, "received a discharge in bankruptcy in regard to the debts and obligations
he was ordered to pay under the Decree of Divorce." 2005 Findings, $ 13. Record
at 530.
5.

In addition to its finding that Mr. Davis had received a discharge in

bankruptcy, the Court found that his income had been reduced from $7,000.00 per
month, to $5,026.00 per month. 2005 Findings, 5 15. Record at 529 - 530. As to
Ms Davis, the Court found that she was still unemployed, and imputed minimum
wage to her. 2005 Findings, If 17. Record at 529. See also, 2010 Findings, record
at 675.
11

6.

Even with having filed his bankruptcy, the Court found Mr. Davis to

be the primary financial contributor to the cost of raising the children. 2005 Findings, 5 28. Record at 527.
7.

Having so found, the Court reduced Mr. Davis' child support obliga-

tion from $1,511.00 to $1,174.00; reduced Mr. Davis' alimony obligation from
$1,000.00 per month to $700.00 per month; granted Mr. Davis the use of the
youngest child, Cierra, as an exemption for tax purposes; and reinstated 55 3 and 4
of the Decree of Divorce, which address reimbursement issues. 2005 Order, 55 7,
9, 16, and 5 respectively. Record at 535 - 537.
8.

Both parties were represented by counsel, at that 2005 Trial. 2005

Order. Record at 479. See also, 2005 Order, Record at 538.
9.

w

The 2005 Order of the Court was again modified, by stipulation of the

parties, on April 10, 2006. See, 2006 Order Modifying Decree of Divorce. Record
at 557.
10.

That modification terminated Mr. Davis' alimony obligation to Ms

Davis. Id. Record at 556.
11.

On April 4, 2008, Ms Davis, through counsel, filed a Petition to Mod-

ify the 2008 Petition, alleging that, due to Mr. Davis' 2003 bankruptcy, the Decree
of Divorce needed to be modified such that:
a.

Ms Davis be allowed to claim all of the minor children as de-

pendents, for tax purposes; and.
b.

Mr. Davis pay one-half (1/2) of the expenses incurred for the

minor children for their extracurricular activities, school registration, and
test fees. 2008 Petition, 55 2, 3, and 4. Record at 558 - 559.
12

12.

The relief sought by Ms Davis was that:
a.

Ms Davis, "be allowed to claim all of the children as depend-

ants for tax purposes..." See, 2008 Petition, 5J 3. Record at 558.
b.

Mr. Davis pay, "one-half of the expenses incurred for the chil-

dren for their extracurricular activities and school registration and test fees."
See, 2008 Petition, 5 4. Record at 558.
c.

Mr. Davis pay Ms Davis' attorney fees. See, 2008 Petition, 5 5.

Record at 558.
13. . That 2008 Petition did not request, nor even mention, a modification
of Mr. Davis' ongoing child support obligation. Record at 558 - 559. See also,
Transcript at p. 4, line 13, through p. 5, line 2.
14.

On November 9, 2009, the Trial Court held a scheduling conference,

at which Ms Davis' counsel gave notice of his withdrawal. See, Record at 588.
The Trial Court set the matter for a one-half (1/2) day bench trial on January 28,
2010. Id.
15.

Ms Davis did not request a modification of child support until No-

vember 23, 2009, when she filed her Answer to Summons and Petitions the Court
to Modify Decree of Divorce, on November 23, 2009. See, Answer to Summons
and Petitions the Court to Modify Decree of Divorce, J 14. Record at 599.
16.

That document is the first time Ms Davis sought an adjustment of

child support, or raised the issue of modifying Mr. Davis' child support obligation.
Id.
17.

On February 17, 2010, the Trial Court entered its Findings of Fact,

Conclusions at Law, and Order Modifying Decree, the, "2010 Findings of Fact".
13

See, Record at 666 -679.
18.

On April 23, 2010, the Trial Court signed, and entered, its Order on

Modification of Divorce Decree (January 28, 2010), the, "2010 Order". Record at
721 -725.

Summary of Argument
Point One: Standards for Modifying Prior Final Orders:
"To succeed on a petition to modify a divorce decree, the moving party must
first show that a substantial material change of circumstances has occurred 'since
the entry of the decree and not contemplated in the decree itself,' Durfee v. Durfee,
796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (emphasis added) (quoting Stettler v. Stettler, 713 P.2d 699, 701 (Utah 1985)); accord Williamson v. Williamson, 1999 UT
App219,5J8,983P.2d 1103." Bolliger, at 906,5 11.
In a modification action, what a party is seeking is to change the current applicable Order, due to current changes; whether the current applicable Order is the
original Decree of Divorce, or a subsequent Order of Modification. If a Decree of
Divorce has been modified on some particular issue, and the parties subsequently
seek to change the current Order on that particular issue, the Court looks at the current Order that is in effect, the Order of Modification. As such, the moving party
must show that the change of circumstances occurred since the entry of the last
Order of Modification.

14

Point Two: Application of Res Judicata to Claims Concerning a Prior Bankruptcy:
"[T]here is no question but that the principle of res judicata applies to modification proceedings, see Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 410 (Utah Ct.App.1990)."
Huish v. Munro, 191 P.3d 1242, 1279, 2008 UT App 283 5 13.
As there is complete identity of parties, and claims in this matter, any issues
raised by Ms Davis concerning Mr. Davis' 2003 Bankruptcy were addressed, or
capable of being raised and addressed, at the 2005 Trial. Ms Davis raised no new
claims. See 2005 Order, Record at 534 - 538, and 2005 Findings, Record at 525 533.
As such, all of Ms Davis' claims, as they relate in any way to Mr. Davis'
2003 Bankruptcy, should have been dismissed in the instant matter. The Trial
Court's review, and rulings based on that 2003 Bankruptcy were in error, and must
be reversed.

Point Three: Modification of Child Support Obligation:
In the instant case, Mr. Davis' gross monthly income increased by only
twenty-four percent (24%). Record at 675. The increase in child support ordered
by the Trial Court, was only nine percent (9%). Id. If "a 25% drop in income ...
does not satisfy the threshold requirement of section 78-45-7.2(7)(b)(iii) [currently
§78B-12-210(9)(b)(iii), Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended)] ... the changes
presented in Father's petition do not qualify as a material substantial change, and
they are insufficient to trigger further consideration of Father's modification petition pursuant to section 78-45-7.2(6)", Diener, 98 P.3d at 1181,5 8, then a twentyfour percent (24%) increase does not qualify as a material substantial change. Ms
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Davis' request for an increase in child support cannot be granted.

Point Four: Retroactive Application of Child Support Obligation:
Child support can only be, "modified with respect to any period during
which a modification is pending, but only from the date of service of the pleading
on the obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner..." See, §78B-12-112(4), Utah Code
Annot. (1953, as amended). If child support is changed, then as Ms Davis did not
request any modification of child support until November 23, 2009 (Record at
599), the Trial Court erred in ordering the change in child support retroactive to
April 4, 2008 (Record at 724). That Order must be reversed.

Point Five: Requirement for Reimbursement of School Expenses:
Absent a showing of particular special needs, or requirements on behalf of a
child, routine school expenses are included in the child support obligation, and the
payor of that child support is under no additional obligation to pay those fees. Such
routine fees are part and parcel of Ms Davis child support award. See, Brooks, and
Andrus v. Andrus, 169 P.3d 754, 2007 UT App 291.
The Trial Court made no findings to justify any variance from the statutory
child support obligations, as required under §78B-12-210, Utah Code Annot. (1953,
as amended). As such, there is no basis to award any additional child support to Ms
Davis. Those lack of findings, along with Ms Davis' failure to show any special
needs to substantiate additional funds, makes the Trial Court's order requiring Mr.
Davis to reimburse those alleged costs error, which must be reversed.
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Point Six:

Requirement for Reimbursement of any Child Related Expenses With-

out Proof of Payment:
In Utah's statutes addressing reimbursement of expenses, Utah's legislature
has expressed a requirement that a parent who incurs medical or daycare expenses,
"shall provide written verification of the cost and payment of those expenses to the
other parent..." See, §78B-12-212. Medical expenses, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as
amended).
, The Decree of Divorce in this matter provided that the parent seeking reimbursement was required to, "provide written verification of the cost and payment of
medical expenses..," (Decree of Divorce, J 4, Record at 96), comport with that
statutory dictate, and provisions. Those provisions were specifically reinstated, via
specific reference, in the 2005 Order; and, that was after the Trial Court's findings
about, and consideration of, Mr. Davis' 2003 Bankruptcy. See, 2005 Order, 5 5.
Record at 537.
The Trial Court's modification of those provisions, requiring reimbursement
without proof of payment, is contrary to statute, and the reinforced provisions of
the Decree of Divorce. Furthermore, the Trial Court cited no specific findings to
justify its order.

Argument
Point One:

Standards for Modifying Prior Final Orders:

"Trial courts in Utah have 'continuing jurisdiction to make substantive
changes and new orders ... based on a substantial material change in circumstances
not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.' Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(g)(i)
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(Supp.2008);(fn4) see Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47, 5 11, 997 P.2d 903."
Young v. Young, 201 P.3d 301, 304, 2009 UT App 3,fl9.
"To succeed on a petition to modify a divorce decree, the moving party must
first show that a substantial material change of circumstances has occurred 'since
the entry of the decree and not contemplated in the decree itself.' Durfee v. Durfee,
796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (emphasis added) (quoting Stettler v. Stettler, 713 P.2d 699, 701 (Utah 1985)); accord Williamson v. Williamson, 1999 UT
App 219,5 8, 983 P.2d 1103." Bolliger, at 906, J 11.
Nowhere in case law, or statute, does counsel find any specific language that
the court must always return to the original Decree of Divorce. Most often, case
law shows that if the issue being modified was addressed in a subsequent Order
Modifying Decree of Divorce, the court only goes back to that last final order
which addressed the matter to be changed; it does not return to the original Decree
of Divorce. Logically, and procedurally, this only makes sense. For in a modification, what a party is seeking is to change the current applicable Order, due to current changes; whether the current applicable Order is the original Decree of Divorce, or a subsequent Order of Modification. If a Decree of Divorce has been
modified on some particular issue, and the parties subsequently seek to change the
current Order on that particular issue, the Court looks at the current Order that is in
effect, the Order of Modification.
The record in this matter shows that Mr. Davis' bankruptcy, and the effects
it had on Ms Davis' financial status; care of the children; the allocation of the minor children as dependents for tax purposes; allocations of marital debt; and, which
party actually provided the most financial support for the parties' children, were all
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reviewed and considered fully by the Trial Court at the 2005 Trial. All were specifically addressed in the 2006 Order.
In filing her 2008 Petition, Ms Davis simply requests a reexamination of the
allocation of the tax exemption for the children, and reimbursement for the children's school expenses, all based upon Mr. Davis' 2003 bankruptcy. Record at
558 - 559.
As such, Ms Davis must demonstrate a that a substantial material change of
circumstances has occurred since the entry of that 2006 Order. This, she fails to
do, and the Trial Court articulates no finding of fact, or conclusion at law, that any
substantial material change of circumstances has occurred since that 2006 Order.
The "principles of res judicata require that 'a party seeking modification of a
divorce decree must demonstrate that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred since the entry of the decree, and not contemplated in the decree itself.'"
^ / / ^ , 9 P . 3 d a t l 7 8 5f2L

Point Two: Application of Res Judicata to Claims Concerning a Prior Bankruptcy:
[T]here is no question but that the principle of res judicata applies to
modification proceedings, see Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 410 (Utah
Ct.App.1990). The application of the principle to such proceedings, however, is moderated by "the equitable doctrine that allows courts to reopen
[custody] determinations [only] if the moving party can demonstrate a substantial change of circumstances." Id. "In order to meet this threshold requirement, a party must show, in addition to the existence and extent of the
change, that the change is significant in relation to the modification sought.
The asserted change must, therefore, have some material relationship to and
substantial effect on parenting ability or the functioning of the presently existing custodial relationship? Becker v. Becker, 694 r.zd 608, 610 (Utah
1984) (second emphasis added).
Huish, 191 P.3d at 1279,2008 UT App 283 5 13.
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The doctrine of res judicata embraces two distinct branches: claim
preclusion and issue preclusion. See Swainston v. Intermountain Health
Care, 766 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1988). Claim preclusion involves the same
parties or their privies and also the same cause of action, " 'and this precludes the relitigation of all issues that could have been
litigated as well as
those that were, in fact, litigated in the prior action.1 " Schaer v. State, 657
P.2d 1337, 1340 (Utah 1983) (quoting Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689,
690 (Utah 1978)).
Macris, 16P.3dat 1219, J 19.
In order for claim preclusion to bar a subsequent cause of action, a
plaintiff must satisfy three requirements:
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the
first suit or must be one that could and should have been raised in the first
action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the
merits.
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988) (citing Penrod, 669
P.2d at 875; Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1981); Int'l
Res. v. Dunfield, 599 P.2d 515, 516-17 (Utah 1979); Krofcheck v. Downey
State Bank, 580 P.2d 243, 244 (Utah 1978); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 521
P.2d 379, 380 (Utah 1974); Natl Fin. Co. v. Daley, 14 Utah 2d 263, 265-66,
382 P.2d 405, 407 (1963); Wheadon v. Pearson, 14 Utah 2d 45,47, 376 P.2d
946, 947-48 (1962)). All three elements must be present for claim preclusion
to apply. See Madsen, 769 P.2d at 247.
Macris, 66 P.3d at 1219,5 20.
Applying the Marc is claim preclusion requirements to the instant case, one
finds all three requirements are met. Specifically:
1.

The same parties: Both parties were present, and testified at the

2005 Trial, and both parties testified at the 2010 Trial. The only difference
between the two (2) trials, is that both parties were represented by counsel
throughout the 2002 Petition, and 2005 Trial, while on the 2008 Petition, and
the 2010 Trial, both parties were, for the most part, pro se. The parties have
been identical throughout this matter. There can be no argument that the
first Marcis requirement was not met.
2.

Barred claims:

All of Ms Davis' claims, which relate to Mr.
20

Davis' bankruptcy, either were raised during the 2005 Trial, or could have
been raised at the time of that trial.
a.

All of the claims Ms Davis raised in her 2008 Petition,

were based upon Mr. Davis' 2003 bankruptcy. Those claims were either specifically addressed at the 2005 Trial, or could, and should have
been raised in that matter, at that time; and, she was represented by
counsel in that matter.
b.

At the 2005 Trial, the Trial Court found Mr. Davis, "re-

ceived a discharge in bankruptcy in regard to the debts and obligations
he was ordered to pay under the Decree of Divorce." 2005 Findings
of Fact, 5 13. Record at 530. Even with having filed his bankruptcy,
the Trial Court found that Mr. Davis was the primary financial contributor to the cost of raising the children. 2005 Findings of Fact, 5 28.
Record at 527. Based thereon, the Trial Court reduced Mr. Davis'
child support obligation from $1,511.00 to $1,174.00; reduced Mr.
Davis' alimony obligation from $1,000.00 per month to $700.00 per
month; and, granted Mr. Davis the use of the youngest child, Cierra, as
an exemption for tax purposes. 2005 Order Modifying Decree, $$ 7, 9,
and 16, respectively. Record at 535 - 536.
3.

The 2002 Petition was resolved by the 2005 Trial. The 2006

Order Modifying Decree, which was a final judgment on the merits, was the
result of that 2005 Trial.
The Marc is test was, and is, met. The doctrine of claim preclusion applies to
all of Ms Davis' claims based upon Mr. Davis' 2003 bankruptcy. The Trial Court
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erred in allowing any testimony on those issues, and in considering any evidence related to those claims. All Ms Davis' claims, based upon Mr. Davis' 2003 bankruptcy should have been dismissed, as Mr. Davis suggested. Transcript at p. 24,
lines 4 - 9 . See also, Record at 562 - 566.

Point Three: Modification of Child Support Obligation:
Utah's legislature has pronounced factors which it deems bear on the issue
of modifying child support.

See, §78B-12-210, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as

amended).
In the instant case, Mr. Davis' child support obligation was last adjusted in
the 2005 Order. Record at 536. See also, 2010 Findings, record at 675. As such,
there has not been any adjustment for more than three (3) years, indicating that
§78B-12-210(8), Utah Code Annot (1953), is applicable. That section states:
(8) (a) If a child support order has not been issued or modified within
the previous three years, a parent, legal guardian, or the office may
move the court to adjust the amount of a child support order.
(b) Upon receiving a motion under Subsection (8)(a), the court
shall, taking into account the best interests of the child:
(i) determine whether there is a difference between the payor's ordered support amount and the payor's support amount that would be
required under the guidelines; and
(ii) if there is a difference as described in Subsection (8)(b)(i), adjust the payor's ordered support amount to the payor's support amount
provided in the guidelines ii:
(A) the difference is 10% or more;
(B) the difference is not of a temporary nature; and
(C) the order adjusting the payor's ordered support amount does
not deviate from the guidelines.
(c) A showing of a substantial change in circumstances is not necessary for an adjustment under this Subsection (8).
In the instant case, Mr. Davis' gross monthly income increased by only
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twenty-four percent (24%). Record at 675. The increase in child support ordered
by the Trial Court, was only nine percent (9%). Id.
Diener appears to be the controlling case on this issue. Diener does not directly address §78B-12-210(8), Utah Code Annot (1953), it does discuss its predecessor §78-45-7.2, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended), in detail.
Diener involves a modification of child support where the father's income
had decreased twenty-five percent (25%). Diener, 98 P.3d at 1181, J 8. If failing
to meet the statutory thirty percent (30%) level, the father appealed the trial court's
denial of his claim. Id.
In its discussion, the Diener court fully reviewed §78-45-7.2(6)(b) Utah
Code Annot. (1953, as amended), now enumerated as §78B-12-210(8), Utah Code
Annot (1953). Diener, at 1181 - 1183, 55 9 - 14. This court held that the trial
court, "must determine whether the petitioner's current obligation, as set by a preexisting court order, is within ten percent (10%) of the presumptive figure arrived
at through the modification petition. If there is a variance greater than 10%, the
statute directs that 'the court shall adjust the amount to that which is provided for
in the guidelines.' Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2(6)(b)." Diener, 98 P.3d at 1182, %
11 (emphasis in original).
The trial court in Diener, also failed to make any detailed findings on the issues, and failed to calculate and apply the statutory guidelines to the parties' jficome. Diener, 98 P.3d at 1183,5 14. Furthermore, there was no evidence, or findings, to justify any deviation from statute. Diener, 98 P.3d at 1183,5 13.
Those failures of the Diener trial court read as identical to the 2010 Findings
of the Trial Court in this matter. The Trial Court made no calculations. No child
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support worksheet is located in the record. And, other than a cursory reference to
the monthly incomes of Mr. and Mrs. Davis, no single finding, nor piece of rational is given for the Trial Court's failure to abide by statute, or to justify varying
from statute.
As noted in Diener, simple arithmetic shows that the changes in income, and
in the child support amount, fail to meet the statutory requirements in the instant
case. See, Diener, 98 P.3d at 1181, 5 8. The Trial Court erred in modifying child
support, and that error needs to be reversed.

Point Four: Retroactive Application of Child Support Obligation:
The Trial Court has continuing jurisdiction to make changes to a party's ongoing child support obligation.

See, §30-3-5(3), Utah Code Annot (1953, as

amended). But, child support can only be, "modified with respect to any period
during which a modification is pending, but only from the date of service of the
pleading on the obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner..." See, §78B-12-112(4),
Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended). And, should the Trial Court determine that
a modification is in order, "the tribunal shall order a judgment to be entered for any
difference in the original order and the modified amount for the period from the
service of the pleading until the final order of modification is entered." Id.
That limitation has been supported by Utah case law, as well. The Trial
Court cannot retroactively apply an order of child support further back in time than
the date of the service of a pleading seeking modification of child support. See,
Brooks, 881 P.2d at 960, Wilde, 35 P.3d at 345 - 346, 2001 UT App at J 20, and
Wall, 157 P.3d at 345,2007 UT App 61 at 5 19.
24

In the instant case, Ms Davis did not request, or even mention, a modification of Mr. Davis's child support obligation. April 4, 2008, was the date Ms
Davis' counsel filed the 2008 Petition. Record at 559. As noted, Ms Davis never
raised a claim to modify child support in that 2008 Petition. Record at 558 - 559.
All she sought, was that she be allowed to claim all of the minor children as dependents, for tax purposes; and, Mr. Davis pay one-half (1/2) of the expenses incurred for the minor children for their extracurricular activities, school registration,
and test fees. 2008 Petition, 55 3, and 4. Record at 558 - 559.
It was not until much later, that Ms Davis raised the issue of changing child
support. That filing, Ms Davis' Answer to Summons and Petitions the Court to
Modify Decree of Divorce {see, Answer to Summons and Petitions the Court to
Modify Decree of Divorce, 5 14), occurred on November 23, 2009. See, 2010
Findings of Fact, p. 2, 5 3, Record at 678, wherein the Trial Court specifically
noted the filing of that pleading. That was over a year and one-half after her filing
of the 2008 Petition.
Yet, the Trial Court concluded that Mr. Davis' child support obligation
should be increased, "retroactive to April 4, 2008, the date the petition to modify
was filed." See, 2010 Findings of Fact p. 11,5 4. Record at 669. Mr. Davis'child
support obligation was increased, retroactive to April 4, 2008, based on that conclusion.
The Trial Court's order that the child support obligation was to be retroactive to April 2, 2008, was contrary to statute, and case law. It was, and is, reversible error. The very earliest date that any notice of Ms Davis' request to change
child support was given to Mr. Davis, was November 23, 2009. The Trial Court
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erred in ordering the application of the change in child support any earlier than
November 23, 2009.

Point Five: Requirement for Reimbursement of School Expenses:
Ms Davis asked for an order that Mr. Davis pay one-half (1/2) of the expenses
incurred for the minor children for their extracurricular activities, school registration,
and test fees. 2008 Petition, 5 4. Record at 558.
The Trial Court found that, "issues of school expenses have arisen that did
not exist when the decree was entered." 2010, Findings, Record at 677. That is the
only finding the Trial Court made on this issue. Nowhere did it specify what those
school expenses were, nor that those expenses represented a material change in circumstances not contemplated in the Decree of Divorce, or subsequent Orders Modifying the Decree of Divorce. Without any such findings to support its conclusion,
the Trial Court simply ordered that Mr. Davis is to reimburse Ms Davis for one-half
(1/2) of reasonable school expenses. 2010 Order, p. 12, 5 8. The Trial Court did
not even limit those expenses to school expenses for the children. As written, one
could even interpret the 2010 Order to require Mr. Davis to reimburse Ms Davis for
any school expenses Ms Davis may incur.
On this particular issue, counsel for Mr. Davis has found only Brooks. In
Brooks, it appears that both parents had agreed upon the desire that their children
attend a private school.
Brooks contains a thorough analysis of Utah's statutory guidelines, and the
burden required to rebut their application. Having completed that analysis, the
Court of Appeals, having found no authority to the contrary, stated its belief that
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private school costs are part and parcel of the child support award. Brooks, 881
P.2dat959,fn 4.
Brooks involved private school costs, with specific findings of the costs, and
history of prior private schooling of the child involved. Brooks, 881 P.2d at 957 959. The Court of Appeals reviewed that case, and found that the only way to require child support, outside of the statutory guidelines establishing child support, was
to show sufficient cause to deviate from the statutory guidelines in a modification
case. Id.
In the instant case, Ms Davis made no showing that the school expenses were
for private school, as agreed to by Mr. Davis. Nor did she show any evidence of
any extraordinary expense, or need on the part of the children. All that she showed
were the same expenses that any parent, of any child attending any public school
might face. Nor did she make any showing, or attempt to show, with any specificity, what those expenses were, nor did her exhibits show any special expenses. In
like manner, the Trial Court made no findings whatsoever as to what expenses existed, nor that the expenses were of any extraordinary nature.
"A trial court's 'findings of fact must show that the court's judgment or decree follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence. The findings should
be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.' Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Acton v. Deliran, 131
P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)) (internal quotations and citation omitted). A trial court's
failure to provide adequate findings is reversible error when the facts are not clear
from the record." Andrus v. Andrus, 169 P.3d at 759, 2007 UT App at J 17.
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Brooks states that that school costs are part and parcel of the child support
award, and that to deviate from the statutory guidelines when setting a child support
award, requires specific findings to substantiate such deviation. Andrus sets forth
the burden for those findings, and the required logical connection to the evidence. It
also states that a failure to provide such findings is reversible error.
Applying Brooks and Andrus to the instant case, leads to the conclusion that
Ms Davis showed no basis to vary from the principle that school costs are covered
by child support, and that the Trial Court, having made no specific findings to the
contrary, erred in requiring Mr. Davis to reimburse those expenses. That ruling is
in error, and needs to be reversed.

Point Six: Requirement for Reimbursement of any Child Related Expenses Without
Proof of Payment:
The Trial Court made the determination that, "[w]here Decree provides for
reimbursement, any party claiming reimbursement must submit evidence of incurring bills... The party need not show that the bill has actually been paid, but need
only show that the expense has been incurred." 2010 Findings, p. 12 5 9; 2010 Order, J10.
Yet, under Utah's statutes addressing reimbursement of expenses, Utah's
legislature has required that a parent who incurs medical or daycare expenses shall
provide written verification of the cost and payment of those expenses to the other
parent..."

See, §78B-12-212. Medical expenses, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as

amended).
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The.Decree of Divorce's provisions, which provided that the parent seeking
reimbursement was required to, "provide written verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses..." (Decree of Divorce, J 4, Record at 96), comport with
that statutory dictate, and provisions. The Decree of Divorce provisions were specifically restated, via specific reference, in the 2005 Order. See, 2005 Order, 5 5.
Record at 537. And, that was after the Trial Court's findings about, and consideration of, Mr. Davis' 2003 Bankruptcy.
So, having been considered in the 2005 Trial, specifically in light of Mr.
Davis' 2003 Bankruptcy, the Trial Court in the instant matter changed that provision, removing the proof of payment requirement. Record at 670. See also, 2010
Order, 5 10, record at 723.
The Trial Court shows no specific finding upon which it bases that change.
The transcript reveals no evidence, nor argument for that change, other than exchanges about outstanding claims for reimbursement made by each party.
However, that finding is made immediately following the Trial Court's brief
four (4) page dissertation on how Mr. Davis' 2003 Bankruptcy breached the conditions of the original (as in the 2002 Decree of Divorce) stipulation and Decree, and
that Ms Davis was due some sort of readjustment of that original contract. See,
2010 Findings, record at 669 - 672.
Having set forth no specific findings as to any change in circumstances since
these provisions were restated in the 2005 Order, the Trial Court had no basis to
modify those provisions. Particularly as the Trial Court had already considered the
effect of Mr. Davis' 2003 Bankruptcy when it made its 2005 Order. There is no
finding in the 2010 Findings, specifically stating any reason to vary from statute.
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No material change in circumstances; there is no basis for reviewing, let
alone changing those provisions. The Trial Court's ruling is in error, and must be
reversed. The party seeking reimbursement of a covered expense must show written verification of the cost and payment of the claimed expense.

Conclusion
The Trial Court erred in modifying the prior Orders. The Trial Court erred
in reconsidering the situation of the parties, in light of Mr. Davis' 2003 Bankruptcy, as that 2003 Bankruptcy had already been addressed in the 2005 Order. As
such, the doctrine of res judicata, specifically the doctrine of claim preclusion, applied. None of Ms Davis' claims which touched upon, or concerned Mr. Davis'
2003 Bankruptcy should have been heard, or allowed.
The Trial Court modified the award of the use of the minor children as exemptions for tax purposes, based upon Mr. Davis' 2003 Bankruptcy. As that issue
had been fully litigated in the 2005 Trial, it was error for the Trial Court to
readdress those issues, and to make any changes to the 2005 Order, on that issue.
The Trial Court also erred in modifying Mr. Davis' child support, as there
had not been the statutorily required change in the child support amount; in making
any such change retroactive to the date of the original petition (April 2008), rather
than when Ms Davis made the request (November, 2009), in violation of statute;
and, in modifying the prior Orders to state that any reimbursement claims did not
require proof of payment, again in violation of statute. Furthermore, the Trial
Court demonstrated no basis, nor rationale, for varying from those statutes.
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All of those errors involved matters of law, statutory interpretation, or some
combination of the two. All those errors should be reversed by this Court.

Respectfully submitted this
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30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of parties and children Division of debts - Court to have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and parent-time Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to
the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in
eveiy decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and
dental expenses of the dependent children including responsibility for health insurance out-ofpocket expenses such as co-payments, co-insurance, and deductibles;
(b) (i) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase
and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent
children; and
(ii) a designation of which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is primary and which health,
hospital, or dental insurance plan is secondary in accordance with the provisions of Section 30-35.4 which will take effect if at any time a dependent child is covered by both parents' health,
hospital, or dental insurance plans;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or
liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's
division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery
Services.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning financial
responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent
children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines
that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared
for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the dependent
children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the
custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution
of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the mother
and father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification.
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents and
other members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the court may
include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, among other things,
authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule entered
under this chapter.
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court
order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees
expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was without
merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith. (7) If a petition alleges noncompliance
with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a grandparent or other member of the
immediate family where a visitation or parent-time right has been previously granted by the court,
the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs

incurred by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise courtordered visitation or parent-time. (8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in
determining alimony: (i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (ii) the
recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; (iii) the ability of the payor spouse to
provide support; (iv) the length of the marriage; (v) whether the recipient spouse has custody
of minor children requiring support; (vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business
owned or operated by the payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly
contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the
payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage, (b) The court
may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. (c) As a general rule, the court
should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in
accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable
principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time
of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the marriage, (d)
The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards
of living, (e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in
the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be
considered in dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one
spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the
marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and
awarding alimony. (f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and
no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each
party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage, (g) (i) The court has continuing
jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce, (ii) The court may not
modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist
at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that
action, (iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not
be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8).
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the payor's
improper conduct justifies that consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the marriage
existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating
circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party
pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that
former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of
alimony sh&il resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his
rights are determined.
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another
person.
Amended by Chapter 285,2010 General Session

Utah Statutes
Title 78A. Judiciary and Judicial Administration
Chapter 4. Court of Appeals
Current through 2010 Legislative Session
§ 78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs
and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies,
except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust
Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the
state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602 ;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a
charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction or
charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals.from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the
Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to,
divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption,
and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the court
may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any matter
over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History. Amended by Chapter 344, 2009 General Session
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Utah Statutes
Title 78B. Judicial Code
Chapter 12. Utah Child Support Act
Current through 2009 Legislative Session
§ 78B-12-112.Payment under child support order - Judgment.
(1) All monthly payments of child support shall be due on the 1st day of each month pursuant to
Title 62A, Chapter 11, Part 3,Child Support Services Act, Part 4, Income Withholding in IVDCases, and Part 5, Income Withholding inNon-IV-D Cases.
(2) For purposes of child support services and incomewithholding pursuant to Title 62A, Chapter
11, Part 3 and Part 4,child support is not considered past due until the 1st day of thefollowing
month. For purposes other than those specified inSubsection (1) support shall be payable 1/2 by
the 5th day of eachmonth and 1/2 by the 20th day of that month, unless the order ordecree provides for a different time for payment.
(3) Each payment or installment of child or spousal supportunder any support order, as defined
by Section 78B-12-102, is, on and after the date it isdue:
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of anyjudgment of a district court, except as
provided in Subsection(4);
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit in thisand in any other jurisdiction; and
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by this or any otherjurisdiction, except as provided in
Subsection (4),
(4) A child or spousal support payment under a support order maybe modified with respect to
any period during which a modificationis pending, but only from the date of service of the pleading onthe obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner, or on the obligor,if the obligee is the petitioner.
If the tribunal orders that thesupport should be modified, the effective date of the modificationshall be the month following service on the parent whose support isaffected. Once the tribunal
determines that a modification isappropriate, the tribunal shall order a judgment to be entered
forany difference in the original order and the modified amount forthe period from the service of
the pleading until the final orderof modification is entered.
(5) The judgment provided for in Subsection (3)(a), to beeffective and enforceable as a lien
against the real property interest of any third party relying on the public record, shall bedocketed
in the district court in accordance with Sections 78B-5-202 and 62A-11-312.5.
History. Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session

37

Utah Statutes
Title 78B. Judicial Code
Chapter 12. Utah Child Support Act
Current through 2009 Legislative Session
§ 78B-12-214.Child care expenses - Expenses not incurred.
(1) The child support order shall require that each parent shareequally the reasonable
work-related child care expenses of theparents.
(2) (a) If an actual expense for child care is incurred, aparent shall begin paying his share
on a monthly basis immediatelyupon presentation of proof of the child care expense, but
if thechild care expense ceases to be incurred, that parent may suspendmaking monthly
payment of that expense while it is not beingincurred, without obtaining a modification of
the child supportorder.
(b) (i) In the absence of a court order to the contrary, aparent who incurs child care
expense shall provide writtenverification of the cost and identity of a child care provider
tothe other parent upon initial engagement of a provider andthereafter on the request of
the other parent.
(ii) In tlie absence of a court order to the contrary, the parentshall notify the other parent
of any change of child care provideror the monthly expense of child care within 30
calendar days of thedate of the change.
(3) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, aparent incurring child care
expenses may be denied the right toreceive credit for the expenses or to recover the
otherparent's share of the expenses if the parent incurring theexpenses fails to comply
with Subsection (2)(b).
History. Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session

78B-12-217
Title 78B - Judicial Code
Chapter 12 - Utah Child Support Act

78B-12-217. Award of tax exemption for dependent children.
(1) No presumption exists as to which parent should be awarded the right to claim a
child or children as exemptions for federal and state income tax purposes. Unless the
parties otherwise stipulate in writing, the court or administrative agency shall award in
any final order the exemption on a case-by-case basis.
(2) In awarding the exemption, the court or administrative agency shall consider:
(a) as the primary factor, the relative contribution of each parent to the cost of raising
the child; and
(b) among other factors, the relative tax benefit to each parent.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), the court or administrative agency may not award
any exemption to the noncustodial parent if that parent is not current in his child support
obligation, in which case the c ourt or administrative agency may award an exemption to
the custodial parent.
(4) An exemption may not be awarded to a parent unless the award will result in a tax
benefit to that parent.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
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RICHARD S. NEMELKA #2396
DENNIS L. MANGRUM #3687
NEMELKA & MANGRUM, P.C
7110 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801)943-8107
Fax: (801) 943-4744
Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LISA DAVIS,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Petitioner,

vs.
Civil No. 024400391
Commissioner Thomas Patten

COREY G. DAVIS,
Respondent.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly before the Honorable Thomas Patten of the
above-entitled Court on the

V f

day of April, 2002, the parties having entered into a

Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement and the same having beenfiledwith the Court and
the Respondent having consented that his default could be heard and said default being entered and
evidence having been received in regard to jurisdiction and grounds based upon the AjQfidavit of
Petitioner and the Court having reviewed the records andfilesherein and being fully advised in the
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premises; the Court having heretofore made and entered its Findings ofFact and Conclusions ofLaw,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
L

The Petitioner be and is hereby is awarded a Decree of Divorce severing the bonds

of matrimony between the parties herein.
2.

That the Petitioner be and is hereby awarded the sole care, custody and control of

the minor children with the Respondent being awarded reasonable rights of visitation pursuant to
Utah Code 30-3-35. Further, it is reasonable that the parties be bound by the advisory guidelines
contained in Utah Code 30-3-33, 36, and 37. A copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
3.

That the Respondent be ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $ 1,511 per month

as more specifically stated in the child support worksheet attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and
incorporated herein by reference. Said child support shall be paid on the first of each month
beginning April 1, 2002, and continuing until the minor children reach the age of eighteen (18) or
their normal class graduates from high school, whichever occurs last. Income withholding relief
consistent with Utah Code Annotated §62a-11 -502, is hereby waived for the reason that the parties
have established an alternate mechanism whereby Respondent is paid the child support due and owing
herein.
Consistent with Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.10, when a child graduatesfromhigh school
and the obligation for the support of that child ends, the base child support award shall automatically
be adjusted to reflect the lower base combined support obligation shown in the statutory table for the
remaining number of children.
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The parties are advised consistent with Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.2(8) that if this child
support order has not been modified within the previous three years, a parent, legal guardian or the
Office ofRecovery Services may petition the Court to adjust the child support order. The Court shall
adjust the support amount if it receives evidence of a non-temporary change often (10%) percent or
more as then calculated under the guidelines. Further, a parent, legal guardian or the Office of
Recovery Services may petition the Court to adjust the amount ofthe child support order at any time
if there has been a substantial change in circumstances since entry of the last child support order.
Also as an additional form of support, each party shall pay one-half (Vi) of all work-related
or vocational-training-related, out-of-pocket child care expenses incurred for the benefit of the
parties' minor children- The parties shall pay their share on a monthly basis immediately upon
presentation of proof of the child care expensesfromthe other party, but may suspend paying the
monthly expense while it is not being incurred. The parent who incurred child care expenses should
provide written verification ofthe costs and identity of the child care provider to the other parent on
engagement of a provider, and thereafter upon the request of the other parent.
4,

Respondent is ordered to obtain and maintain insurance for the minor children. Each

party shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid by a party for the
children's portion ofinsurance. The children's portion of the premium shall be deemed the per capita
share of the premium actually paid. The premium expense for the children shall be calculated by
dividing the premium amount by the number ofpersons covered under the policy and multiplying the
result by the number of children in the instant case.
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Each party is ordered to share equally in all reasonable and necessary uninsured medical
expenses, including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the dependent children and actually
paid by the parties. The parties shall cooperate by exchanging all claim forms and statements received
by insurance companies in order to coordinate the payment of all such expenses.
Consistent with UCA §78-45-7.13, each party who carries such insurance shall provide
verification of coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of
the Social Security Act, 42 USC 601, et seq. upon initial enrollment of the dependent children, and
thereafter on or before January 2nd of each calendar year.
Each party who incurs medical expenses for the children shall provide written verification of
the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other within thirty days ofpayment. Any party who
fails to comply with the above notice provisions) may be denied the right to receive credit for an
expense or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses. If either party chooses to use a
provider, hospital, or care giver outside of the insurance plan, then that party will be responsible for
all of said expenses for the same.
5.

The Respondent is ordered to maintain life insurance on his life in the sum of at least

$ 150,000.00 naming the Petitioner and the minor children as beneficiaries thereon until such time that
alimony and child support terminates. Respondent shall provide Petitioner a written verification of
said life insurance policy on an annual basis.
6.

That the Respondent is ordered to pay to the Petitioner alimony in the sum of $1,000

per month beginning with thefirstmonth after the home and residence of the parties is sold. Said
alimony shall terminate upon the remarriage,
4
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cohabitation or death of the Petitioner or nine (9) years from the date of the Decree of Divorce,
whichever occurs first.
Further each party is ordered to exchange theirfinancialinformation each year by April 30,
including W-2s, tax returns, and recent pay stubs.
Respondent shall pay the child support on thefirstof each month to Petitioner by making a
direct deposit of said amounts into an account identified by Petitioner.
7.

The Petitioner be and is hereby awarded all of the net equity receivedfromthe sale

of said home and residence.
8.

The parties are hereby awarded as her or his sole and separate property, all items of

personal property as they have heretofore tentatively divided it and is in their possession except for
a few items as. agreed upon between the parties that should be also awarded to the Respondent.
9.

That the Respondent be ordered to assume and pay the marital debts and obligations

to MBNA, First USA and First National, together with the loan at Bank One in regard to his truck.
It is reasonable that the Petitioner pay the debts and obligations at Sears, Retailers National and Farm
Bueau, and the debt and obligation on her car at Wells Fargo Bank. It is reasonable that each party
indemnify and hold the other party harmless therefrom and further that each party assume and pay
any and all other debts incurred by that party in their own name that are not stated herein.
Further, the Respondent Corey Davis is ordered to assume and pay the first and second
mortgages on the home and residence of the parties until the same is sold. In consideration thereof,
the Respondent shall not have to pay alimony until thefirstmonth after the home and residence is
sold. Also, the monthly child support obligation of $ 1,511 shall be reduced to $ 1,400 per month until
5
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said home and residence is sold. However, the first month immediately following the month that the
home and residence is sold, the Respondent shall pay $ 1,511 in child support and $ 1,000 in alimony.
Further, the Respondent agrees to co-sign on a loan for the Petitioner to purchase a new home
after the home and residence of the parties is sold as long as he has thefinancialmeans to do the
same.
10.

That any and all assets not disclosed by either party or stated herein are ordered to

be equally divided between the parties.
11.

Petitioner be and is hereby entitled to claim the minor child Cierra as a dependent for

tax purposes and the Respondent is entitled to claim the minor child Kayla as a dependent for tax
purposes. Further, in regard to the third child Shian, the Petitioner is awarded said child as an
exemption for even number years starting with the year 2002 and the Respondent is awarded said
child as a dependent for tax purposes in odd years.
12.

Both parties be and hereby are restrainedfromusing illegal drugs or abusing alcohol

when either have custody or visitation with the minor children. Further, both parties shall be
restrainedfromsaying any derogatory, demeaning, or disparaging remarks about the other party in
the presence of the minor children or allowing the minor children to be present when any third parties
are making any derogatory, demeaning, or disparaging remarks about the other party.
13.

Each be and hereby is awarded one-half of any and all retirement accounts and

benefits asd/or annuities acquired by either party and accrued during the marriage.
14.

Respondent is ordered to pay $2,000 toward Petitioner's attorneys fees and each

party shall pay their own attorneys fees and costs except as stated herein.
6
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15.

The Respondent hereby acknowledges that the Petitioner had his consent to withdraw

moniesfromthe joint bank account that the Respondent held with himself and his mother and also
his own personal account
16.

Each party be and is hereby ordered to sign and execute any and all documents or

instruments necessary to eflfectuate the transfer of legal interest in and to the marital assets as stated
herein in accordance with this stipulation and property settlement agreement.
DATED this J 2 ? day of ^ril, #)02.
tf H4 R££>

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

W

Matthew P. Jtide, Attorney for Respondent

<p*^ *ftr?3p
Darold J. MeDade, Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Decree ofDivorce via the United
States mail, postage prepaid; on the J~t day of April, 2002, to the following attorney Jbr
Respondent:
7
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I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY O f
AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH'
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Matthew P. Jube
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO
101 East 200 South
Springville, UT 84663
Darold J. McDade
Assistant Attorney General
150 East Center Street, Suite 2100
Provo,UT 84606
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing ORDER ON MODIFICATION OF
DIVORCE DECREE was mailedfirstclass, postage prepaid on the \ 2 day of April, 2010 to:
David Hartwig
1817 South Main Street #17
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
Attorneyfor Respondent

An employee qflChristensen THoi
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Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Lisa Davis,
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Petitioner,
Case No.: 024400391
vs.
Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor
Corey G. Davis,
Respondent

The above matter was heard before the Honorable James R. Taylor of the Fourth District
Court on April 21,2005. Petitioner was present and represented by her attorney, Richard S.
Nemelka. The Respondent was present and represented by his attorney, D. Bruce Oliver.
Witnesses were sworn and testified and exhibits were admitted. At the close of Respondent's
presentation of evidence regarding a change in circumstances since the original decree, the
Petitioner made a Motion to Dismiss Respondent's request for a change of custody. The Court
heard argument andfindsas follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. A Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter on or about May 23,2002, where the
Petitioner was awarded the sole care, custody and control of the parties, minor children and the
Respondent was ordered to pay child support in the sum of $1511.00 per month and alimony in
Page 1 of 9
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the sum of $1,000.00 per month together with other obligations as stated therein.
2. Respondent filed a Petition for Modification in October of 2002 and Petitioner filed an
Answer and Counter-Petition in November of 2002.
3. Various hearings were held on Petitioner's Orders to Show Cause and Respondent's
Motion on Januaiy 6, 2003, April 24,2003, December 16,2003 and August 3,2004, and Orders
were entered in regard to those hearings. RespondentfiledObjections to some of the
recommendations of the Commissioner in regard to those hearings and the Court agreed to hear
Objections at the above-mentioned trial.
4. The Petitioner, Lisa Davis, had problems with the use of illegal drugs and alcohol
prior to the divorce which was known to the Respondent. Based upon that, the parties stipulated
in the Decree of Divorce, paragraph 12, that both parties would be restrained from using illegal
drugs or abusing alcohol when either party had custody or visitation with the minor children.
Respondent'testified that he stipulated to Petitioner being awarded the sole custody of the minor
children at the time of the Decree of Divorce based upon his belief that the Petitioner would
discontinue her use of the illegal drugs.
5. In approximately July of 2003, Petitioner pled guilty to a Class A misdemeanor for
driving under the influence with the minor children present in the vehicle. Further, Petitioner
later violated her probation by testing positive for illegal substances.
6. Petitioner was ordered in her criminal action to undergo monthly urinalysis tests
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which she had donefromJuly of 2004 through April of 2005. None of the tests indicated use of
a controlled substance. Petitioner did miss one test in March of 2005 because of car problems.
7. The Court found that there had not been a significant and material change in
circumstances since the entry of the Decree of Divorce. The Court further found that although
the Respondents trust in the Petitioner has changed and that he does not believe she will
continue to refrainfromusing illegal drugs this change in Respondent's trust does not constitute
a significant change of circumstances justifying a change of custody.
8. The Court granted Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Respondent's claim for a change of
custody. The Petitioner shall continue to have the care, custody, and control of the minor
children and all provisions of the Decree of Divorce relating to custody shall remain in full force
and effect
9. Based upon the parties1 Stipulation as well as the Court'sfindingthat it is in the best
interest of the children to modify the parenting time schedule, the Respondent and the Petitioner
shall be bound by the relocation statute, Utah Code § 30-3-37 and § 78-45-7.11.
10. It is reasonable that both parties exchange their current addresses and phone numbers
and in the event of a change in either their address or phone number they shall forthwith notify
the other party. Further, when the Respondent has the minor children for parenting time he shall
provide to the Petitioner a contact person and phone number.
11. Although there was a dispute between the parties as to whether or not the Petitioner
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has received the health insurance cardfromthe Respondent or verification of his life insurance, it
is reasonable that the Respondent provide to the Petitioner an insurance card for the minor
children's health insurance and a description of the benefits as well as a copy of his life insurance
policy or verification of the same as required by the Decree of Divorce. The Respondent shall
provide the Petitioner with an insurance card and the verification of the life insurance policy by
immediately mailing those documents by certified mail with a return receipt.
12. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Decree of Divorce will continue to govern the payment of
medical insurance premiums, non-covered medical expenses and day care expenses.
13. The Courtfindsthat the Respondent failed to pay the full amount of his child support
and alimony obligations evidenced by the Office of Recovery Services child support and alimony
payment histories admitted by the Court as Exhibits 1 and 2. The Respondent also received a
discharge in bankruptcy in regard to the debts and obligations he was order to pay under the
Decree of Divorce.
14. The Respondent admitted that he knew of the Orders of the Court in regard to his
obligation and the Court furtherfindsthat he had the ability to pay the child support and alimony
obligations prior to October of 2003.
15. At the time of the Decree of Divorce in May of 2002 the Respondent's gross monthly
income was $7,000.00 per month and the Petitioner's gross monthly income was zero. The
Respondent testified that in October of 2002, he lost the employment that he had at the time of
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ftfe-Decree of Divorce. However, his gross income for the year 2002 was $95^,000.00. No
credible evidence was provided by the Respondent in regard to the amount of income he received
from October 2002 until October of 2003. However, in October of 2003 he obtained his current
employment earning $29.00 per hour for a 40-hour week which equals $5,026.00 per month.
16. The Courtfindsthat Respondent's income as of October 2003 has been reduced
approximately 29% and, based thereon, a significant and material change of circumstances has
occurred in regard to his income justifying the Court reviewing the child support and alimony
obligations.
17. The Petitioner is still unemployed; however, the Courtfindsthat the Petitioner could
workftdl-timeand imputes income to her at minimum wage of $940.00 per month,
18. It is reasonable that the child support obligation be reduced to the sum of $1,174.00
beginning in October of 2003 and that the Respondent shall pay to the Petitioner child support in
the sum of $1,174.00 effective October 2003 and continuing thereafter pursuant to the terms of
the Decree of Divorce.
19. The Courtfindsthat the Respondent's income beginning October 2003 has been
reduced approximately 30% than at the time of the Original Decree and therefore reduces his
Alimony obligation by 30%. It is reasonable that the alimony payment of $1,000.00 per month
be reduced to $700.00 per month effective October of 2003 and that those alimony payments
shall continue until terminated as stated in paragraph 6 of the Decree of Divorce.
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20. It is reasonable that income withholding relief consistent with Utah Code § 62(a)-11502 and other applicable statutes be forthwith put into effect to enable the Office of Recovery
Services to continue to collect from the Respondent the child support and alimony obligations.
21. The Court will not change the previous judgment for arrearages in child support and
alimony written in the Orders signed on April 8,2003 and June 26,2003 which encompass the
time periods beginning October 2002 through April 2003. The Court admitted the Office of
Recovery Services' child support and alimony payment histories as Exhibits 1 and 2. Based on
these exhibits, the total still outstanding for these judgments is $2,872.40 in principal and $8.16
in accrued interest as of April 2005 for alimony and $1280.91 in principal and $3.64 in accrued
interest as of April 2005. for child support. Statutory interest will continue to accrue on these
amounts. The Office of Recovery Services may continue to execute upon these existing
judgments.
22. Based on Exhibits 1 and 2, the total amount of child support owed by the Respondent
for the time period beginning May 2003 through April 12,2005 is $10,120.25 with interest
accruing at the statutory rate.
23. Based on the Office of Recovery Services Alimony Payment Histories, the total
amount of alimony owed by the Respondent for the time period beginning May 2003 through
April 12,2005 is $7,025.91 with interest accruing at the statutory rate.
25. The Court does not find the Respondent in further contempt because Respondent had
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made substantial payments toward child support and alimony. Previous contempt sanctions will
be held in abeyance so long as the Respondent pays $100.00 per month to Petitioner toward the
arrearage judgments for child support and alimony.
26. It is reasonable that the previous judgments against Respondent for Petitioner's
attorney fees, written in the Orders on April 8,2003, June 26,2003 and December 16,2003,
which totaled $4,000, with interest accruing, remain the same.
27. Neither party shall be awarded attorneys fees in regard to the Petition and CounterPetition to Modify and the trial in this matter.
28. The Court received evidence showing that Respondent is the primary financial
contributor to the cost of raising the children. The Court using its equitable powers under the
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.21findsthat paragraph 11 of the parties, Decree of Divorce
regarding who is entitled to claim which children as dependants for tax purposes should be
modified. The original decree entitles Petitioner to claim the youngest child, Cierra, as an
exemption, while entitling Respondent to claim the middle child, Kayla, as an exemption. This
Courtfindsthat the Decree should be modified to entitle Respondent to claim the yoxmgest child,
Cierra as an exemption, while entitling the Petitioner to claim the middle child Kayla as an
exemption. The provision alternating the use of the oldest child, Shian, as an exemption is not
modified. This Court further orders that if one party is unable to make any benefit from any
exemption(s), then the other party is entitled to full use of the exemption(s).
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29. That all other provisions of the Decree of Divorce shall remain in full force and
effect.
Conclusions of Law
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court makes and enters its Conclusions of Law:
1. Petitioner's motion to dismiss Respondent's claim for a change of custody shall be
granted and the custody of the minor children shall remain with the Petitioner as stated in the
Decree of Divorce.
2. That the Decree of Divorce shall be amended and modified pursuant to the Findings of
Fact as stated above.
Dated this / f T day of &c&-

, 2J

Judge James R. Taylor
Fourth Jafflicial District Qi

A certificate of mailing is on the following page.
Page 8 of 9

56

Davis v. Davis, Memorandum Decision
Copies of this Decision mailed to:
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Richard Nemelka
6809 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Counsel for the Respondent:
D. Bruce Oliver
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490
Mailed this d yday of

£jCA

2005, postage pre-paid as noted above.

; 6 ^L
Court Clerk
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Lisa Davis,
Order Modifying Decree of Divorce
Petitioner,
!

Case No.: 024400391

vs.
Division VII: Judge James R- Taylor
Corey G. Davis,
Respondent

The above matter was heard before the Honorable James R. Taylor of Hie Fourth District
Court on April 21,2005. The Petitioner was present and represented by her attorney, Richard S.
Nemelka. The Respondent was present and was represented by his attorney, D. Bruce Oliver.
Witnesses were sworn and testified and exhibits were admitted. At the close of Respondent's
presentation of evidence and information regarding a change in circumstances since the original
decree, the Petitioner made a Motion to Dismiss Respondent1s claimrequestinga change of
custody. The Court having heard argument on the same and the Court having heretofore made
and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
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1. Petitioner's motion to dismiss Respondent's claim for a change of custody is granted,
custody of the minor children shall remain with the Petitioner as stated in the Decree of Divorce.
2. The Respondent and the Petitioner shall be bound by the relocation statute, Utah Code
§30-3-37 and §78-45-7.11.
3. Both parties are ordered to exchange their cuircnt address^ and phone numbers and in
the event their address or phone number changes to forthwith notify the other party. Further,
when the Respondent has the minor children for parenting time he shall provide to the Petitioner
a contact person and phone number.
4. Respondent is ordered to provide the Petitioner an insurance card for the minor
children's health insurance and a description of the benefits as well as a copy of his life insurance
policy or verification of the same as required by the Decree of Divorce. The Respondent shall
immediately mail the documents by certified mail with a return receipt
5. Paragraphs 3 and 4 oftheDeare of Wvoro
medical insurance premiums, non-covered medical expenses and day care expenses.
6. The Office of Recovery Services may continue to execute upon existing judgments for
arrearages in child support and alimony for orders signed on April 8,2003 and June 26,2003,
which encompass October 2002 through April 2003. As of April 21,2005, the total still
outstanding for these judgments is $2,872.40 in principal and $8.16 in accrued interest for
alimony and $1,280.-91 in principal and $3.64 in accrued interest for child support
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7. The child support obligation is reduced to the sum of $1,174.00 beginning in October
of 2003. The Respondent shall pay to the Petitioner child support in the sum of $1,174.00
effective October 2003 and continuing thereafter pursuant to the terms of the Decree of Divorce.
8. Petitioner is granted judgment for arrearages in child support for the time period May
2003 through April 2005 which includes the change of the child support obligation effective
October of 2003. Based on evidence received, the total amount of arrearages in child support
due and owing by the Respondent to the Petitioner for the time period beginning May 2003
through April 12,2005 is $10.120.25 with interest accruingatthe statutory rate.
9. It is ordered that the alimony payment of $1,000.00 per mon&L be reduced to $700.00
per month effective October of 2003 and that those alimony payments shall continue until
terminated as stated in paragraph 6 of the Decree of Divorce.
10. Petitioner is granted judgment for arrearages in alimony for the time period
beginning May 2003 through April 12,2005 which includes the change of the alimony obligation
effective October of 2003. Based on evidence received, thetotalamount of arrearages in
alimony for time period May 2003 through April 12,2005 is $7.025,91 with interest accruing at
the statutory rate.
11. Income withholding relief consistent with Utah Code § 62(a)-l 1-502 and other
applicable statutes is allowed to etiable the Office of Recovery Services to continue to collect
child support and alimony obligationsfromthe Respondent
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12. The Court does notfindthe Respondent in further contempt because Respondent had
made substantial payments toward child support and alimony,
13. Previous contempt sanctions will be held in abeyance so long as the Respondeat pays
$100.00 per month to Petitioner toward the arrearage judgments for child support and alimony.
14. This order does not alter previous judgments for attorney fees, included in the Orders
of April 8,2003, June 26,2003 and December 16,2003, which total $4,000, with interest
accruing.
15. Neither party shall be awarded attorney's fees inregardtothe Petition and CounterPetition to Modify and the trial in this matter.
16. The Divorce Decree is modified to entitle Respondent to claim the youngest child,
Cierra as an exemption. The Petitioner may claim the middle child Kayla as an exemption. The
provision alternating the use of the oldest child, Shian, as an exemption is not modified. This
Court orders that if one party is unable to make any benefit from any exemptions), then the other
party is entitled to full use of the exemption(s).
17. All other provisions of the Decree of Divorce shall remain in full force and effect
Dated this Flf day of

Judge Ja&es R. ifcyh^ <&
FourtiWudicial District Coi
A certificate of mailing is on the following page.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LISA DAVIS,

PETITION TO MODIFY

Petitioner,
vs.
COREY G. DAVIS,

Civil No. 024400391
Commissioner Thomas Patten

Respondent.
COMES NOW Petitioner, Lisa Davis, by and through her undersigned counsel of record,
Richard S. Nemelka, and respectfully petitions the Court and alleges as follows:
1. A Decree of Divorce and a subsequent Order Modifying the Decree were entered in the
above matter in regard to claiming the children as tax dependents, ordering the Respondent to pay
debts and cosign for Petitioner to buy a house.
2. There have been the following changes of circumstances justifying a modification of the
Orders of the Court.
A. The Respondent filed bankruptcy and no longer is paying the debts he was ordered
to pay.
B. The Petitioner's credit has been ruined by the Respondent's failure to pay the
debts as ordered by the Court.

n
Deputy

^

C. The Petitioner has incurred additional expenses for the minor children for extra
circular activities, school registration and test fees, and other expenses.
D. The Petitioner has a greater need to claim the minor children as dependants.
E. Petitioner desires to purchase a house.
3. It is reasonable that the Petitioner be allowed to claim all of the minor children as
dependants for tax purposes since Respondent has not cosigned on a loan for the Petitioner to buy
a house, and no longer has to pay the marital debts..
4. It is reasonable that the Respondent pay one-half of the expenses incurred for the children
for their extra circular activities and school registration and test fees.
5. It is reasonable that the Respondent pay Petitioner's attorney's fees if this matter is
contested.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that the Court modify the Decree and subsequent Orders
consistent with the terms and provisions as stated herein.
DATED this

^t)

day of March, 2008..
NEMELKA & NEMELKA

RICHARD S. NEMELKA
Attorney for Petitioner
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LISA DAVIS
PROSE
851 NEWBOILD CIRCLE
MEDVALE, UT 84047
801-568-2666

IN THE FOURTH JUDICTOAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UTAH COUNTY STATE OF UTAH

ANSWER TO SUMMONS

LISA DAVIS,
Petitioner,
vs.

AND PETITIONS THE COURT
TO MODD7Y DECREE OF DIVORCE

COREY DAVIS,
Respondent.

Civil No. 024400391

THE STATE OF UTAH TO COREY DAVIS:
COMES NOW Petitioner, Lisa Davis and respectfully petitions the court also providing
answers to said summons, alleges as follows:
1. A Decree of Divorce and a subsequent Order to Modifying the Decree were entered in
the above matter in regard to claiming the children as tax dependants, ordering the Respondent to
pay debts.
2.. There have been the following changes in circumstances justifying a modification of the
Orders of the Court
A. The Respondentfiledbankruptcy and no longer is paying debts he was
ordered to pay.
B. The Petitioner's credit has been ruined by the Respondents failure to pay the
debts as ordered by the court.
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C. The, Respondent was also Ordered in the Decree of Divorce to pay the
mortgage payment on the house until sold. With the Respondent failing to do so, the house was
foreclosed upon.
D. The Respondent was court ordered to pay First National bank of Omaha in the
Decree of Divorce. Since he filed bankruptcy, this credit card company is presently taking the
Petitioner to court for the amount of $15,000.00.
E. The Petitioner has incurred additional expenses for the minor children for extra
circular activities, school registration and test fees, and other expenses.
F. The Petitioner has a greater need to claim the minor children as dependants.
Since the Respondent only visit's the children mice a year.
G, The Respondent has failed to provide W-2's and tax returns as court ordered.
H. The Respondent has failed to provide proof of life insurance for the past years.
3. It is reasonable that the Petitioner be allowed to claim all three as dependants for tax
purposes. This benefit's the children seeing how the children live with the Petitioner.
4. It is reasonable that the Respondent pay one-half of the expense incurred for the
children for their extra circular activities and school registration fees and test fees.
5. The Petitioner has fulfilled all obligations of Decree of Divorce.
6. The Respondent has failed to provide a list of eye care providers. Since the Respondent
is in fact the primary provider.
7. The Respondent has failed to provide any statements or any list of providers for
medical and dental under the Respondents insurance plan. Therefore, he should still be
responsible for one-half.
8. The Petitioner has provided proof of all payments made by the Petitioner on all
medical and dental.
9. The Respondent has also failed to make any payments towards medical and dental bills
for the year 2009.
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10. The Respondent was behind $268,00 at the time die airfare tickets were purchased.
The Respondent had told the children he would pay for the tickets this year because he was behind
In medical expenses owed the Petitioner. And diey were going to L.A., Calif Not Newport
Oregon where the Respondent resides.
11. The Petitioner requests a judgment be made of $494,42. This amount is one-half
Medical and Dental expenses the Petitioner has already paid for the year 2009.
12. It isreasonablethe Respondent pay for all air fare for the childrenfromthis day
forward.
13. It is reasonable the Respondent show proof of life insurance coverage for the past 7
years. Since die Petitioner has not received proof of such. There should be no diange in die
amount of die life insurance policy.
14. It is reasonable to adjust the child support amounts with income verifications of taxes.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that the Court modify the Decree and subsequent Orders
consists with the terms and provisions as stated herein.
DATED diis _ d l _ <% o f November, 2009.

/si/id.

LISAT3AVIS

OdinA

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the answer and petition to modify via United States
mail postage prepaid, on the r V i
Corey Davis
11415NECoosSL
Newport, Oregon, 97365

day of November, 2009, to the following;
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Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order Modifying Decree

LISA DAVIS,
Petitioner,

Date: February 17, 2010

v.
COREY G. DAVIS,

j

Respondent.

Case No. 024400391
Judge David N. Mortensen

This matter came before the court for bench trial January 28,2010. Both parties
represented themselves. This court reviewed the pleadings with the parties, received testimony
and evidence, and listened to the arguments of the parties. The matter is before the court on
petitions to modify a divorce decree. Now being fully apprised in the matter, the court enters the
following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and enters a order modifying the decree.
Findings of Fact
This matter arises out of a decree which was entered on May 23,2002. The matter has
been subject to almost continual disagreements, thefirstpetition to modify having been filed
onlyfivemonths after the initial decree. This decree was last modified April 10,2006 when the
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court terminated alimony based upon cohabitation.
The court discussed at the trial of this matter the difference between an order to show
cause and a petition to modify. This difference is not one of semantics, and if correctly
understood by the parties, that understanding may lead to a more orderly future. If either party
believes that the other party is violating the terms of the decree or any specific modification
thereof, that party isfreeto file an order to show cause. An order to show cause will be quickly
dispatched by a court commissioner. An order to show cause does not need to go through a fullblown trial. In other words, an order to show cause may be addressed far more efficiently and
quickly, which will be to all parties' benefit.
A petition to modify a decree, on the other hand, involves circumstances where the party
must show that a material change in circumstances has occurred and that the actual terms of the
decree should be changed. As should be obvious, if one is claiming a violation of a previous
decree, one would not bring a petition to modify, since the party is not seeking to modify the
decree, but to enforce it.
The latest petition to modify wasfiledApril 4,2008 by Mrs. Davis. A counter-petition
was filed November 5,2009 by Mr. Davis. A document was filed November 23,2009, entitled
"Answer to summons and petitions the court to modify decree of divorce," which this court takes
as a counter-petition to the counter-petition. This court finds that the respondent has declared
bankruptcy and that by virtue of that bankruptcy filing, the creditors are now seeking to recover
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fundsfromthe petitioner. Although the respondent claims that the petitioner'sfinancialstatus is
a function of mismanagement of her ownfinances,the court was presented with little evidence of
that being the case. The court finds that the home previously shared by the parties was
foreclosed upon. The court finds that the initial decree provided that respondent would pay for
certain debts. The court finds that those debts have not been paid. The court therefore finds that
although bankruptcy was a right respondent could and did invoke, that by so doing he has
effectively takenfromthe petitioner the benefit of her bargain in arriving at the stipulation which
forms the basis of the original decree.
This courtfindsthat a material change in circumstances has occurred. One of the
children has now turned 18. Further, the bankruptcy of the respondent has materially affected the
financial condition of the petitioner. Finally, issues of school expenses have arisen that did not
exist when the decree was entered.
While issues more properly brought in an order to show cause hearing should not be
addressed in these proceedings, since both parties failed to object to receiving evidence
concerning the same, this court intends to resolve them now.1 This court finds that air fare has
been incurred in connection with respondent's exercise of his summer visitation in the amount of
$543.60, half of which is $271.80. Although these tickets were for a vacation with respondent in
California, instead of Oregon where he resided, the tickets are still relatively cheap.

l

See Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b).
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Additionally, there was no evidence presented that on the dates in question a flight to Oregon
would have been cheaper. Therefore, the courtfindsthat respondent should be reimbursed
$271.80frompetitioner
The court finds that under the present decree of the court each party claims one dependent
on their taxes and then they trade every other year taking a tax deduction for the third child. The
previously entered decree required the respondent to obtain life insurance in the amount of
$150,000. However, in the interim time one child has turned 18 years of age. The petitioner on
behalf of the children has incurred medical expenses of $374.61 (including eyecare) which have
not been reimbursed by the respondent. A dispute has arisen amongst the parties as to whether
the petitioner must take the children to an eye care professional covered by respondent's
insurance plan, or in other words, whether the respondent can force the petitioner to take the
children to a provider inside the plan when going to a plan provider which will cost more money
than going to another provider outside the plan.
The court alsofindsthat the parties incomes have changed significantly, most
significantly being that of the respondent. The last court order to specifically address the
incomes of the parties was entered October 26, 2005. The court noted that at the time of the
decree in May of 2002 the respondent's gross monthly income was $7,000 per month and the
petitioner's gross monthly income was zero. The respondent had testified that he lost his
employment, but the court noted that his gross income for the year 2002 was $95,000. In
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October 2003, the respondent obtained his then-current employment through which he made
$5,026 per month. The court found that as of October 2003, respondent's income had reduced
approximately 29%. Although the petitioner was still employed, the court found the petitioner
could work Ml time and imputed to her the minimum wage of $940 per month. The court
therefore found it was reasonable that the child support obligation should be reduced to the sum
of $ 1,174 beginning October 2003. On April 10,2006, the court entered an order modifying the
decree so that no alimony was owing.
The courtfindsthat the reasonable expenses the petitioner incurs monthly are $4,027.99
as testified to in court. The courtfindsthat the reasonable monthly expenses of the respondent
are $2,224 as testified to in court. The court alsofindsthat, based upon his last paycheck in
2009, respondent is making $74,979.52 per year, or $6,248 per month. The court received no
evidence that this amount would likely diminish in the future. Accordingly, this courtfindsthat
this amount should be used for the determination of child support.
In contrast, petitioner claims income of $15,286 per year, or $1,273 per month..
Minimum wage is currently $7.25 per hour which equates to $15,080. This court agrees with
previous rulings which have found in this case that minimum wage should be imputed to the
petitioner. But since she claims that she makes slightly more, the higher amount should be used.
Using these figures the court determines that the respondent's child support obligation is $1,287
per month.
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The courtfindsthat the purpose of life insurance provisions and decrees is to ensure that
child support obligations will be paid into the future. Multiplying out the monthly obligation of
the respondent for the remaining time his children will be under the age of 18, the courtfindsthat
a policy in the amount of $ 150,000 in life insurance is no longer necessary. The court
specifically finds that a total of $115,000 of life insurance should be in force and that this amount
will protect the children in this matter as to the support associated with them. The court has
specifically considered the present value of money. If the respondent were to die today and the
life insurance were paid and reasonably invested, that investment would produce a net income of
more than $115,000.
The court further finds it is reasonable that the petitioner be able to verify the in force
nature of life insurance policy. Accordingly, respondent to shall be required to submit
documents proving the enforce nature of a life insurance prop up policy every six months.
Should respondent failed to provide the documentation, or should the documentation show any
period of a lapse policy, the court may require the policy to be maintained by the petitioner, with
afinancialobligation for the premium to be assigned to the respondent. Alternatively, the court
could find respondent in contempt and enter a judgment against the respondent.
Finally, the $115,000 in life insurance should only list petitioner Lisa Davis and the
children of this marriage as beneficiaries or payees in the event of respondent's death. If the
$45,000 policy provided through respondent's employment requires the listing of a spouse, then
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respondent will need to obtain a stand alone policy in the amount of $115,000.
The courtfindsit reasonable that thefinancialimpact of the children should be as little as
possible. It is not in the interest of any party to waste money. Accordingly, the petitioner is
required to use eye care professionals within respondent's health insurance plan, unless she can
obtain those services and products cheaper through another source. If they are obtainedfroma
cheaper source, respondent is still responsible for one half of the expenses related to vision care.2
The courtfindsthat because of the financial impact the bankruptcy has had upon the
petitioner, the petitioner should be able to claim all the tax exemptions for all the children.
Accordingly, the wife is awarded the tax exemption for the minor children of the parties. The
husband has the option of paying the wife any tax benefit she would derivefromclaiming the
minor children as exemptions and claiming exemption himself, if he complies with the following
requirements:
A*

He notifies the wife on or before February 15 of each year;

B.

He is current in his child support obligation for the preceding calendar year;

C.

He pays the wife the tax benefit she would derivefromclaiming the exemptions;
and

D.

He pays for an accountant to determine what the tax consequences would be for

2

The court has noted an assertion by respondent that he should befreedfroman
obligation in the decree to co-sign on a home loan should the petitioner attempt to purchase a
home. The court was provided no basis to change that provision of the decree. Therefore, the
co-sign obligation remains in full force and effect.
7

the parties.
When the respondent has met the aforementioned conditions, the petitioner shall immediately
sign and return the documents required by the Internal Revenue Service to permit the respondent
to claim the exemptions for the applicable tax year.
As the court indicated to the parties at trial, a question existed as to whether the court
could consider the respondent's post-decree filing of bankruptcy and reconsider the obligations
of the parties. The answer under Utah law is "Yes." In the case of Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748
P.2d 210 (Utah App. 1988), the court was faced with a situation where a party to a divorce
declared business and personal bankruptcy and ceased making payments for the benefit of the exspouse, thus causing her to assume thosefinancialresponsibilities. In the initial stipulations
before the court, the wife had expressly waived anyrightto receive alimony. The Utah Court of
Appeals looked to the case of Beckman v. Beckman, 685 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1984) where the Utah
Supreme Court examined another bankruptcy situation in a divorce case. In Beckman, the
defendant was discharged in bankruptcy subsequent to a divorce decree in which he was ordered
to make payments on debts and to hold his wife harmlessfromthem as described in a settlement
agreement. The trial court found that the obligation to pay marital debts was a support obligation
which was not dischargeable by bankruptcy. The Utah Supreme Court agreed.
Essentially, the courts are enforcing decrees under a contract theory, looking at the
agreement between the parties to a divorce. When parties negotiate and agree upon terms to
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settle their divorce and entry into the stipulation incorporating those terms, the stipulation is an
enforceable agreement. When a respondent such as Mr. Davis agrees to assume and pay certain
debts for the benefit of a petitioner such as Mrs. Davis, that is a promise upon which the
petitioner Gan rely* While the creditors no longer can go against the respondent because of the
bankruptcy, the petitioner can because the original decree in this matter placed upon respondent
obligation to pay those bills.
The Kinsman court explained:
When defendant willfully avoided his required performance through
bankruptcy, he failed to perform the condition precedent. Having failed
to perform, he now seeks to enforce the agreement against plaintiff.
Such a result will not be tolerated. Failure of the material condition
precedent relieves the other party of any obligation to perform. The
stipulated agreement is no longer enforceable against plaintiff. The
court is placed in the position as if there had been no agreement and no
distribution of property. The court should look to the present condition
and needs of the parties and enter judgment accordingly.
Mat 213.
Thus, in the present circumstances, this court must look to the current financial needs of
the parties and make a determination of financial matters. This court finds that the bankruptcy
filed by respondent is a breach of the condition of the original stipulation and decree that he pay
certain marital debts. The only remedy sought by the petitioner is that she receive the financial
benefit of the tax deduction. The court agrees this will be a just and fair result given that
respondent has failed to perform.
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The court has also noted that the present decree does not require the parties to mediate
before bringing matters before the court. This should be changed. For any issues in the future,
the parties mustfirstsubmit the matter to good faith mediation before bringing the matter before
the court. Additionally, where the decree provides for reimbursement, any party claiming
reimbursement must submit evidence of incurring bills within 30 days of the bill being incurred,
or the claim will be waived. The party need not show that the bill has actually been paid, but
need only show that it has been incurred.
The evidence at trial was insufficient for this court to determine attorney fees in this
matter, specifically whether the attorney fees are related to the issues which have been
adjudicated here. Accordingly, the court does notfindthat attorney fees should be awarded in
this case.
Conclusions of Law
Based upon the findings above, the court concludes that:
1.

The petitioner on behalf of the children has incurred medical expenses one half of
which is $374.6L

2.

Respondent should be reimbursed $271.80frompetitioner for one half of the
travel expenses for respondent's visitation.

3.

The medical expenses and travel expenses offset each other. Accordingly,
judgment will be entered against respondent Mr. Davis in the amount of $102.81.
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4.

The respondent's child support obligation is $1,287 per month retroactive to April
A; 2008; the date the petition .to modify was-filed.

5.

Petitioner is awarded the tax exemption for the minor children of the parties. The
husband has the option of paying the wife any tax benefit she would derive from
claiming the minor children as exemptions and claiming exemption himself, if he
complies with the following requirements:
A.
B.
C.
D.

He notifies the wife on or before February 15 of each year;
He is current in his child support obligation for the preceding calendar
year;
He pays the wife the tax benefit she would derive from claiming the
exemptions; and
He pays for an accountant to determine what the tax consequences would
be for the parties.

When the respondent has met the aforementioned conditions, the petitioner shall
immediately sign and return the documents required by the Internal Revenue
Service to permit the respondent to claim the exemptions for the applicable tax
year.
6.

$ 115,000 of life insurance shall be in force at all times. Respondent shall be
required to submit documents proving the in force nature of a life insurance policy
every six months. Should respondent fail to provide the documentation, or should
the documentation show any period of a lapse policy, the court may require the
policy to be maintained by the petitioner, with afinancialobligation for the
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premium to be assigned to the respondent. Alternatively, the respondent may be
held in contempt for failure to keep a life insurance policy or policies in the
amount of $ 115,000 in place. The $ 115,000 in life insurance should only list
petitioner Lisa Davis and the children of this marriage as beneficiaries or payees
in the event of respondent's death. If the $45,000 policy provided through
respondent's employment requires the listing of a spouse, then respondent will
need to obtain a stand alone policy in the amount of $ 115,000.
7.

The petitioner is required to use eye care professionals within respondent's health
insurance plan, unless she can obtain those services and products cheaper through
another source. If they are obtained from a cheaper source, respondent is still
responsible for one half of the expenses related to vision care.

8.

The decree is hereby modified to require respondent to reimburse petitioner for
one half of reasonable school expenses.

9.

For any issues in the future, the parties mustfirstsubmit the matter to good faith
mediation before bringing the matter before the court. Additionally, where the
decree provides for reimbursement, any party claiming reimbursement must
submit evidence of incurring bills within 30 days of the bill being incurred, or the
claim will be waived. The party need not show that the bill has actually been
paid, but need only show that the expense has been incurred.
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10.

Attorney fees are denied.

11. . . All other claims for relief are denied.
The decree is so modified.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated February 17,2010.

«&!•&&

Judge David N. Moi
Fourth Judicial Distii

A certificate of mailing is on the following page.
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LISA DAVIS,

ORDER ON MODIFICATION OF DIVORCE
DECREE
(JANUARY 28,2010)

Petitioner,
vs.

Civil No. 024400391
Judge David N. Mortensen

COREY DAVIS,
Respondent

This Court, having heard this matter on January 28,2010, and good cause appearing
therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Judgment is entered against Respondent in the amount of $ 102.81. This amount

represents the difference between the amount Petitioner has incurred in medical expenses, one
half of which is $374.61, and the amount Respondent has incurred in travel expenses, one half of
which is $271.80.

%\

2.

Respondent's child support obligation is raised to $ 1,287 per month, retroactive to

April 4,2008.
3.

Petitioner is awarded the tax exemption for the minor children of the parties. The

husband has the option of paying the wife any tax benefit she would derive from claiming the
minor children as exemptions and claiming exemption himself, if he complies with the following
requirements:
A.

He notifies the wife on or before February 15 of each year,

B.

He is current in his child support obligation for the

preceding calendar year;
C.

He pays the wife the tax benefit she would derive from

claiming the exemptions; and
D.

He pays for an accountant to determine what the tax

consequences would be for the parties.
4.

When Respondent has met the aforementioned conditions regarding claiming the

tax exemption, Petitioner shall immediately sign and return the documents required by the
Internal Revenue Service to permit the Respondent to claim the exemptions for the applicable tax
year.
5.

Respondent maintains $115,000 of life insurance in force at all times.

Respondent is required to submit documents providing the in force nature of a life insurance
policy every six months. Should Respondent fail to provide the documentation, or should the
documentation show any period of a lapse policy, the court may require the policy to be
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maintained by the Petitioner, with afinancialobligation for the premium to be assigned to the
Respondent. Alternatively, the Respondent may be held in contempt for failure to keep a life
insurance policy or policies in the amount of $115,000 in place.
6.

The $115,000 in life insurance only list Petitioner Lisa Davis and the children of

this marriage as beneficiaries or payees in the event of Respondent's death. If the $45,000 policy
provided through Respondent's employment requires the listing of a spouse, then Respondent
must obtain a stand alone policy in the amount of $ 115,000.
7.

Petitioner is required to use eye care professionals within Respondent's health

insurance plan, unless she can obtain those services and products cheaper through another
source. If they are obtained from a cheaper source, Respondent is still responsible for one half of
the expenses related to vision care.
8.

The decree is hereby modified to require Respondent to reimburse petitioner for

one half of reasonable school expenses.
9.

For any issues in the future, the parties mustfirstsubmit the matter to good faith

mediation before bringing the matter before the court
10.

Where the decree provides for reimbursement, any party claiming reimbursement

must submit evidence of incurring bills within 30 days of the bill being incurred, or the claim
will be waived. The party need not show that the bill has actually been paid, but need only show
that the expense has been incurred.
11.

Attorneys fees are denied.

12.

All other claims for relief are denied.
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Dated this ^4?day of April, 2010.

Approved as to form:

David Hartwig
Attorney for Respondent
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